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The Composite Text and Nodule MiningOver-Regulation as a Threat to the
"Common Heritage of Mankind"
By THEODORE M.

BEurrLE R

Member of the class of 1978.

A

T THIS VERY MOMENT the Pacific Ocean floor is covered with
at least 1.6 trillion metric tons of rocks.' The unitiated reader
will probably ask, "Vho cares?" The answer is that over one hundred
governments and at least four international ocean mining consortia
care very much about the future of those rocks.2

The problem of international management over the deep seabed
and its mineral resources has become one of the most difficult issues

in Law of the Sea negotiations. 3 Discordance and division within
Committee 14 arise not from whether there shall be international reg-

ulation of seabed exploitation but from opposing views as to the form
and extent such controls should take. The most recent manifestation
of this impasse is found in the very instrument that is intended to
serve as a means of reaching agreement - the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text 5 (hereinafter referred to as the Composite Text)

which was produced in part by Committee I during the most recent
round of negotiations held in New York during the summer of 1977.
1. See text accompanying note 27, infra.

2. More than 1600 participants from 145 countries took part in the Law of the
Sea negotiations held in New York during the summer of 1977. N.Y. TnhnEs, July 16,
1977, § 1 at 4, col. 3. See also text accompanying notes 33 and 34, infra.
3. J. SuLixavA,

PA CIFIC BAsIN ENTPrmsE AND tE CHmGNoG LA

oF TI=

SEA

4 (1977).
4. Three sub-committees were established by the United Nations in 1971 to deal
with specific areas in Law of the Sea. U.N. Pnnss RELEASE SEA/18 May 28, 1974.
Sub-Committee I (hereinafter referred to as "Committee r') was assigned the task of
drafting treaty articles concerning the management of the seabed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. Sub-Committee II was designed to prepare a comprehensive
list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea and to prepare draft treaty
articles thereon. Sub-Committee M was instructed to prepare draft treaty articles on
matters dealing with the preservation of the marine environment and scientific research.
Id.
5. 77 U.N. GAOR, TsmD CoNmEmEcn ON Ta IAw or Tm SEA (6 Sess.), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/WF. 10 (1977).
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Sections of the text dealing with seabed minerals have failed to reconcile the divergent interests at play; the developed and the developing
worlds have not been brought any closer to agreement as to the direction that should be taken for the raising up of minerals from the
bottom of the ocean.
In the view of the United States delegation, one of the failings
of the Composite Text is that by its terms it would set a limit on the
production of hard seabed minerals that is far more stringent than
would be necessary to protect the economies of developing states who
produce the same minerals.; It is the position of this note that the
underlying assumption within the Composite Text that nodule mining
poses a grave threat to developing state producers is unjustified and
contradicted by recent studies examining the probable economic impact of such mining.
I. BACKGROUND
It has been more than ten years since the question of international
control over deep ocean minerals was brought to the attention of the
world community. In his now historic address delivered before the
United Nations General Assembly on August 17, 1967, the U.N. Ambassador of Malta, Dr. Arvid Pardo, called for the internationalization
of the seabed and the declaration of its resources as "the common
heritage of mankind."7 He proposed that control and exploitation of
the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction be controlled and administered by an international agency.8
The reaction of the U.N. was to establish an Ad Hoc Committee
of thirty-five nations to prepare a study on the scientific, technical,
economic and legal aspects of the seabed and ocean floor., By the
end of 1968, the General Assembly endorsed the 'view that exploration and exploitation of the seabed should be carried out for the benefit of mankind with considerations being given to the interests and
needs of developing states. 10 After further study,' the General Assembly by a vote of 62-28-28 called for a moratorium on all exploita6. Press statement released by Ambassador Elliot Richardson, United States Representative to the United Nations, July 20, 1977.
7. Request for the Inclusion of Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the TwentySecond Session from Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Permanent Mission of Malta to the
United Nations, U.N. Doe. A/6695 (August 17, 1967).
8. Id.
9. 22 U.N. GAOR, REs. 2340.
10. 23 U.N. GAOR, REs. 24670.
11. U.N. Doc. A/7622.
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tion of resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
2

national jurisdiction.1

The common heritage concept was initially acknowledged and
endorsed by the United States through a speech delivered on November 8, 1967 by the then American Ambassador to the U.N.,
Arthur J. Goldberg.' 3 The United States reiterated this position in
its Declaration of Principles. 4 But while the United States and most
developed states have acknowledged the general principle of the
common heritage concept, there remains a broad rift between the
views of developed states on the one hand and those of developing
states on the other as to how controls over this "common heritage"
should be implemented.
The object of this debate is the vast accumulation of hard minerals strewn mosaic-like across the floors of the world's three major
oceans. Commonly referred to as manganese nodules, these minerals
are described as often tending to be potato-shaped, dark in color
5
and ranging on the average between 0.5-25 centimeters in diameter.2
The nodules are known to contain more than twenty-seven different
elements including aluminum, iron, zinc, chromium and titanium. 16
Of immediate economic interest, however, are the relatively high
amounts of manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel contained within
7

the nodules.1

Although the existence of manganese nodules has been known
since the British-financed Challenger expeditions of 1873-18761s the
actual process of formation remains uncertain.1 9 It was widely believed that chemical reactions were responsible for nodule formation
but more recent findings indicate the strong possibility that microbiological processes may play a role. -0
Manganese nodules are found on the seabeds of all the major
12. 24 U.N. GAOR, RES. 2574A-D.
13. Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Representative to
the United Nations, to Committee I of United Nations Law of the Sea (Nov. 8, 1967).
14. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/49 (Aug. 4, 1971).
15. J. MmEo, THE Mnm. L REsouRcEs op THE SEA 131, 132 (1965).
16. Id. at 180.
17. M. GRoss, OCE

OGRAHy 115 (1968).

18. R. Homme, MArmm CHumasTR 403 (1969).
19. M. GRoss, supra note 17, at 115.
20. Behrman, The New Wave in Oceanographg, UNESCO Coulun, Jan. 1977, at
21. See also Dugolinsky, Life Forms on Manganese Nodules, OcEAN MNIm-, Aug.
1976, at 88.
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oceans.21 While typically found in waters at least as deep as 2000
meters 22 they also form at shallower depths, in bays, seas and even

in some lakes. 23 It appears, however, that the question of nodule
mining will remain an international matter since only those nodule

deposits lying on the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction are of economic interest. 24 At this time it seems unlikely
that a viable nodule mining operation could be established within
25
the jurisdiction of any coastal state.

The greatest abundance of nodules is in the Pacific Ocean where
it is estimated that nodules are present on two-thirds of the seabed.26 The amount this represents is staggering. It is believed that
there may be 1.6 trillion metric tons of nodules in the Pacific Ocean

alone. 27 In terms of production this could ultimately mean anywhere
from 190 to 460 mine sites, each capable of producing 75 million metric tons of nodules over a period of commercial exploitation lasting
twenty-five years. 28 The actual metal content of nodules varies depending on the area of the ocean in which they are located 2 but

in general, nodules from known deposits contain approximately 25
percent manganese, 1.30 percent nickel, 1.10 percent copper, and 0.20
percent cobalt.30 It is estimated that even if only one nodule deposit
in ten proves economic to mine, the sea floor deposits contain enough
21. Chester, Elemental Geochemistry of Marine Sediments, in 2 CwmdxcAL OcEAN38 (J. Riley & G. Skirow, eds., 1965).
22. Albers & Meyer, New Information on Worldwide Seabed Resources, 2 OcAN
MANAcEMENT 74 (1974).
23. R. HORNE, supra note 18, at 403.
24. Branco, Rational Development of Sea-Bed Resources: Issues and Conflicts, 1
OcEAN MANAGEMmN 41-42 (1973).
25. Albers & Meyer, supra note 22, at 74.
26. Rona & Neuman, Energy and Mineral Resources of the Pacfic Region in Light
of Plate Tectonics, 3 OcEAx MANAcmEN 71 (1976).
27. J. MERo,supra note 15 at 175. See also Glassner, The Iitsory Treasure of Davy
Jones' Locker, 13 SAN Dmco L. REv. 533, 536 (1976). All quantities are expressed in
metric tons unless otherwise indicated.
28. OCEAN MNG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPr. OF INTEMon, MANGANESE NODULE
REsOuacEs AND MnE SITE AVAILrABITY 1 (Aug. 1976).
29. J. MFRo, supra note 15, at 225-30 describes four distinct types of nodules
found in separate areas on the Pacific floor: (1) those with high Iron content, lying
along the continents and in an area between New Zealand and Tahiti; (2) those with
high manganese content found off the west coasts of North and South America; (3)
nodules with relatively high levels of nickel and copper in the areas farthest removed
from land; and (4) nodules that are high in cobalt, located in the Central Pacific.
30. 2 STANFonD REsF&ancH INs'nurE, WORLD MiNmsiU AvAnnuiTrr (Stage 1,
Final Report) 126 (Table 19) (1976).
oGRAPI?
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metals to last for thousands of years at the present rates of consumption. 3
It was against this backdrop that Pardo's 1967 address was presented. American industry had been interested in the possibility of
nodule mining since the late 1950's and the notion of international
regulation of the seabed was regarded as an unpleasant prospect.32
At the present time there are four United States companies actively involved in the pre-production stage of development for nodule
mining: Deepsea Ventures of U.S. Steel, International Nickel-U.S.,
Kennecott Copper Corporation and Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation. All of these are international consortia.33
There are over forty private corporations from Japan, North
America and Europe presently engaged individually or collectively
in some form of preparation for seabed mining 34 and at least eight
governments are likewise involved in some aspect of research, development or subsidization of private industry.35 The cost of each fullscale mining operation, which includes recovery, transportation and
processing systems, may vary from $300 to $600 million; minimum
investment by American industry in the next four to six years could
be approximately $2 billion.30 It is believed that full-scale recovery
of nodules could begin in 1981-1983.37
Because nodule mining demands such high amounts of capital
and such an advanced degree of technological sophistication, it is
31. J. MEao, supra note 15, at 277.
32. J. SuvLrVA, supra note 3, at 7, 49.
33. OCEAN MINo AD. %nasTRAT-oN, U.S. DEP'T. oF IN-ERon, OCEAN MmmoG AN EcoNo~nc EVALuATiON 2, B-2 (1976). In 1974 a joint venture was announced by
Kennecott Copper (a United States corporation). Its partners include corporations from
England, Canada and Japan. Also in 1974, the Deepsea Ventures of United States Steel
(formerly of Tenneco of the United States) joined with three Japanese companies and
later with Union Miniere (Belgium) and Sun Corporation (United States). International Nickel Co. of Canada is also working with Japanese and European partners.
Several U.S. companies are also part of the twenty-five-company Ocean Resources consortium (La Jolla, California) along with companies from Japan, France, Australia,
Canada and West Germany. See generalbj S. ODA et al., A NEw Rftcumr For m
OcEANs 31, 32 (The Trilateral Commission: Triangle Paper No. 9, 1975); J. SuwuvAN,
supra note 3, at 58.
34. J. SuLLrivAN., supra note 3, at 59.
35. Australia, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union,
Japan and New Zealand. Pontecorvo, Reflections on the Economics of the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 2 OCEAN DEvELoPmNT AND INTEnNATIONAL LAw 209 (n.10)
(1974).
36. Welling, Next Step in Ocean Mining - Large Scale Test, MNmIN Co.nEtss
JourNA.T, Dec. 1976, 46, 50.
37. OCEAN MINING AD MNISTR-ATON, supra note 33, at 3.
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beyond the reach of all but the richest and most developed states and
their private corporations. The quest for nodule recovery has required
the collective efforts of international consortia to overcome extraordinary problems and expenses. The current situation is a classic example of the developed world having capital available to risk and
risking it with a reasonable chance of a successful venture and profitable return. The subsequent result is that the gap in relative wealth
between the developed and developing worlds is broadened even
further.
The proposed internationalization of deep seabed resources therefore represents a radical innovation: through the administration of
an international authority, wealth that is generated by the technology
and activities of some of the most developed states will be partially
redistributed to all states, with particular emphasis on the needs of
the developing world. 38 This will be achieved by the recovery of resources that are deemed to belong to all of humanity.
I. THE NEGOTIATING TEXTS
Inevitably, debate concerning the nature and extent of authority
of the proposed deep seabed regime reflects ideological and substantive conflicts of interest between rich and poor states more than any
other issue in Law of the Sea negotiations. 89 Developing states are
generally pushing hard for a seabed authority with broad and extensive control while the developed states who are in the position of
soon being able to commence mining operations seek an authority
with only general licensing and supervisory powers.40
The major area of conflict in the negotiation of the regime is
the opposing interests of the industrial countries that are promoting the new marine mining technology (which are also the major
importers of minerals) and the countries presently exporting these
minerals. In practical terms, the conflict centres on the extent of
control over volumes of production to be exercised by the future
international sea-bed resource organization, commonly referred to
in U.N. parlance as the machinery. The seriousness with which
the two major groups are trying to defend their interests cannot
be overemphasized. The control, or lack of it, could be exercised
in two areas, namely in the decision-making organs of the machinery and in the special type of arrangements for the exploitation of resources. The industrial countries, irrespective of ideology,
favour a representation on the Council (the executive organ) which
38. Goncalves, Who Owns the Oceans? UNESCO Coumum, Jan. 1977, at 6-8.
39. S. ODA, et. al., supra note 33, at 15.
40. Branco, supra note 24, at 43-47.
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would not automatically give a voting majority to the developing
countries. They have also proposed that the role of the authority
be limited to the granting of licenses to interested parties. Alternatively, the developing countries insist on a one-country one-vote
system in the Council, and they generally favour mineral exploitation directly by the authority or through joint ventures and service
contracts.41
One problem that impeded progress during the initial negotiations
was the lack of a common starting point in all three Committees.
To facilitate discussions, in 1975 the Conference requested the Chairmen of its three main committees to prepare a three-part "Informal
Single Negotiating Text"42 covering the subjects within each Committee. The text represented an attempt to present a document for
negotiating purposes only; it was intended to be informal in character and would not prejudice the position of any delegation.
In 1976 the Revised Single Negotiating Text was prepared to
represent a further stage in the work of the Conference. Again, the
purpose of the text was to serve only as a basis for negotiation and
would not affect the right of any delegation to introduce amendments
or new proposals. As with the first text, the revised text would as far
as possible take into account and reflect all of the formal and in44
formal discussions and negotiations that had already taken place.
The Composite Negotiating Text" is the latest product of the
talks that took place over the summer of 1977 and, like its predecessors, was intended in theory to be representative of the most recent
stage of discussions. As in the earlier texts, the Composite Text formally endorsed the Common Heritage principle in Articles 136 and
140. But the most recent text limits the production of seabed minerals to protect developing state mineral producers from any adverse
effects to their economies as a result of seabed mining. The relevant
language is found in the statement of policies in Article 150 of the
Composite Text:
(g) the protection of developing countries from any adverse effects on their economies or on their earnings resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected mineral, or in the volume of
that mineral exported, to the extent that such reductions are caused
by activities in the Area, through the following:
41. Id. at 47.
42. U.N. Doc.
43. U.N. Doc.
44. U.N. Doc.
Conference.
45. Supra note

A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Parts I, II, I1, (May 1975).
A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Parts I, II, II (May 1976).
A/CONF. 62/WP.SfRev. 1/Part I: Note by the President of the
5.
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B. (i) The Authority shall limit in an interim period specified
below, total production of minerals from nodules in the Area
so as not to exceed for the first seven years of that period the
projected cumulative growth segment of the world nickel demand. After the first seven years of the interim period total
production of minerals from nodules in the Area shall on a
yearly basis not exceed 60 percent of the cumulative growth
segment of the world nickel demand, as projected from the
beginning of the interim period ....
(iii) The rate of increase in world nickel demand projected
for the interim period referred to in subparagraph (i) above
shall, for the first five years of the interim period, be the annual
constant percentage rate of increase in world demand during
the 20-year period to 1 January 1980. The calculation of such
rate of increase in world nickel demand shall be made by application of the least squares method using definitive data
from the latest 20-year period prior to that date, and for whidh
such data are available. Thereafter this rate of increase shall
be adjusted every five years on the basis of a recalculation
applying the aforesaid method and using definitive data from
the latest 10-year period prior to the commencement of any
such five-year period, and for which such data are available.
D. Following the recommendations from the Council on the
basis of advice from the Economic Planning Commission, the
Assembly shall establish a system of compensation for developing countries which suffer adverse effects on their export
earnings or economies resulting from a reduction in the price
of an affected mineral or the volume of that mineral exported,
to the extent that such reduction is caused by activities in the
Area.48
To appreciate the change in position that Article 150 of the Composite Text represents, the above language should be compared to
the stance taken in the Revised Single Negotiating Text. Although
that text lacked the specific production controls later adopted in the
Composite Text it nevertheless more fully represented the diverse
views of developed and developing states by establishing in Article
9 a "substantial decline/significant share" test as a means of defining
47
and limiting the term "adverse effects."
Activities in the Area shall be undertaken in such a manner as to:
1. Foster the healthy development of the world economy and
46. Id. at section 4, article 150.
47. This should not be construed as meaning that the Revised Singlo Negotiating
Text was regarded by all sides as completely satisfactory but only that its definition
of "adverse effects" reconciled competing interests more successfully than tho present
Composite Text.
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a balanced growth in international trade, and to promote international cooperation for the over-all development of all countries,
especially of developing countries;
4. Protect against the adverse economic effects of a substantial
decline in the mineral export earnings of developing countries for
whom export revenues from minerals or raw materials also under
exploitation in the Area represent a significant share of their gross
domestic product or foreign exchange earnings, when such decline
is caused by activities in the Area... 48
The desire to protect less developed country mineral producers
(hereinafter referred to as LDC producers) from a world market
glutted with more cheaply produced seabed minerals has been a recurring theme within Committee I negotiations. A principal aim of
the Single Negotiating Text and of the Revised Single Negotiating
Text as indicated in Article 9 has been to insulate from severe economic consequences LDC producers of nickel, copper, cobalt and
manganese through production and pricing controls of seabed minerals.

49

Article 9 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text implicitly acknowledged that deep seabed mining would affect land-based mineral
production to some extent. The Article 9 test conditioned in general
terms the imposition of seabed production controls upon a showing
that mineral or raw material exports of a developing country producer for whom such exports represented a "significant share" of
gross domestic product or foreign exchange earnings would risk a
"substantial' decline in such earnings as a result of deep seabed
mining. 50
The current Composite Text has eliminated the significant share/
substantial decline test and, if taken literally, would impose production and price controls upon a showing of any adverse effects whatsoever resulting to the economy of an LDC producer. Even if seabed
minerals produced by U.S. firms are consumed or stockpiled entirely
within the United States and are not exported, by the terms of the
Text those firms will still face production controls and redistribution
of profits to the extent that U.S.-bound mineral exports of an LDC
are diminished to any extent. The Composite Text ignores the relative significance or insignificance of mineral exports to an LDC producer's economy and would impose controls regardless of how small
48. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Part. I art. 9 (1976).
49. See generally J. SurLvAN, supra note 3, at 8.
50. Supra note 48.
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a share such exports iepresent in the LDC's overall domestic product
or how small such a reduction in exports might 'be.5"
Subparagraph B(i) of Article 150 establishes production controls
for an unspecified period beginning in 1980. During the first seven
years of the interim period total production of minerals from nodules
will not be allowed to exceed the projected increase in world nickel
demand as computed in accordance with the process outlined in subparagraph B(iii). Thereafter, total production of minerals from nodules for the balance of the interim period will on a yearly basis not
exceed 60 percent of the projected increase in world nickel demand. 2
These controls may be interpreted in the following ways:
(1) the combined tonnage of all minerals extracted from nodules
may not exceed the tonnage represented by the projected
increase in world demand for nickel; or
(2) the production of nickel from nodules may not exceed the
estimated increase in demand for nickel but all other minerals from nodules may be produced to an unlimited extent;
or

(3) only enough nodules may be raised from the ocean floor as
will yield and not exceed the projected increase in nickel
demand. Production of copper, cobalt and manganese would
be limited to the amounts that could be extracted from this
fixed nodule supply.
The first interpretation represents the most extreme view of the
production control in Article 150 and must be rejected. Under this
approach all mineral production from nodules would be limited to
an amount fixed by the projected increase in nickel demand. Ocean
miners would have to determine which of the components in nodules
are most economically attractive to recover and forfeit recovery of
the rest. Since nickel is the substance in nodules of the greatest immediate economic interest 3 it would probably be produced in favor
of copper, cobalt and manganese. It is unimaginable, however, that
those developed states having private corporations with nodule mining
interests would ever consent to such harsh, wasteful and unprofitable
restrictions.
The second interpretation is likewise untenable. The explicit purpose of Article 150 in the Composite Text and Article 9 in the Revised Single Negotiating Text is to prevent LDC producers from being
51. Supra note 5 at Section 4, article 150, subparagraph (g).
52. Id. at subparagraph (g)B(i).
53. Tinsley, supra note 36, at 31. Branco, supra note 24, at 50.
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wiped out by cheaply produced seabed minerals. This goal could
never be served by limiting production of nickel alone. As will be
shown, it is the world markets in cobalt and manganese that will
most likely experience the greatest effects from nodule mining, not
nickel. 54
Interpretation three, therefore, appears to be the correct construction of Article 150. Since most ocean mining firms are primarily interested in producing nickel it should be possible to determine the
tonnage of nodules that would yield the amount represented by the
increase in world nickel demand. This could be accomplished theoretically by determining the percentage of nickel contained within
nodules from any given deposit. This method limits the total amount
of nodules that could be raised and achieves the result of restricting
production of copper, cobalt and manganese as well as nickel.
The net effect is that the amount of the world nickel market represented by the demand level existing before the interim period begins in 1980 would be reserved exclusively for land-based mining
operations. Competition with nodule nickel would be limited to the
extent that the projected demand increase exceeds the pre-interim
demand level for nickel as calculated in subparagraph B(iii) (Figure
1). After the first seven years of the interim period, land-produced
FIGURE 1

H-projected increase
actual demand.
7

6'
6-

trend in

demand

World nickel
demand
(metric tons)
Time-

1980

1987

Amount of nodule production allowed under Article 150 of the

.Informal Composite Negotiating Text.
54. See text accompanying notes 66-123, infra.
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nickel and, of course, copper, cobalt and manganese from land sources,
would have to compete with nodule minerals for only 60 percent of
the projected increase in nickel demand. Subparagraph B(iii) also
provides for readjustment of the projected demand level at five-year
intervals, beginning in 1985.
The Composite Text represents, in the view of the United States
delegation a step backward from meaningful discussion concerning
seabed mining and the future of international use and regulation of
ocean resources. The Text was supposed to have taken into account
and hopefully even have reflected all formal and informal discussions
and points of view; those sections concerning seabed mining do not.
Discussions on matters pertaining to ocean mining were more accurately reflected in the texts prepared for consideration by Minister Jens
Evensen of Norway, who had led intersessional consultations and who
had successfully chaired informal work of the Conference on other
major issues at earlier sessionsS5
The texts Evensen produced in Committee I on matters such as
the systems of exploitation and governance of the International Seabed
Authority were widely regarded by developing and industrialized
states as a sound basis for negotiation if not compromise50
The texts that found their way into the Composite Text on the
subject of deep seabed mining were "substantially different" from those
produced by Evensen and unlike the Evensen texts were neither seen
in advance nor considered by any representative group or the Conference as a whole.57 The present section in the Composite Text dealing
with seabed mining was prepared by Committee I Chairman Paul Engo
of the Cameroon and deviated markedly from the proposed compromise
5
text prepared by Evensen. S
In his press release issued July 20, 1977, Ambassador Elliot Richardson complained of the lack of fair and open processes in the preparation of the seabed mining text and expressed his belief that the Composite Text had actually set back the chances of agreement on an
international regime for the conduct of seabed mining. 5 Ambassador
Richardson deemed the Composite Text "fundamentally unacceptable" on a number of important substantive points in addition to the
55. Delegation Report: Sixth Session of The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (unclassified) (May 23 - July 15, 1977).

56. Id.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 3.
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serious questions of procedural abuse.0 0 One of the issues that drew
his fire was the Article' 150 system of production controls of which
he said:
The controls would set an artificial limit on seabed production of
minerals from nodules - which is not only objectionable in principle; it is also far more stringent than would be necessary to protect
specific developing country producers from possible adverse effects,
and is incompatible with the basic economic interests of a developing world generally61
Whether the controls established by the Composite Text are unnecessarily protective of LDC land-based producers will depend of
course on the impact ocean mining will exert on the world mineral
markets. Predictions concerning the relative profitability of nodule
mining and the resulting effects on land-based producers are difficult
to make. Among the complicating factors is "the notoriously complex
question of mineral prices" 2 which ties directly to trends and fluctuations in the world economy. Regardless of which studies and econometric models are applied, any estimates regarding nodule mining are
ultimately highly speculative as would be the estimates of any industry that has yet to begin full scale commercial operations. 3
. To compound the uncertainty of forecasting the consequences of
ocean mining, Article 150 leaves unanswered questions concerning the
meaning of "any adverse effects" and does not indicate whether the
controls are designed to protect LDC producers who suffer insignificant
losses due to nodule mining along with those who may stand to lose
a great deal.
Quite apart from the problem of forecasting, however, is the problem of defining exactly what constitutes lost revenue. Is it the difference between that amount of revenue an exporter might earn
in 1985 in the absence of nodule mining and the amount actually
earned in the presence of seabed mining? This measures the absolute difference in earnings at some future point in time. Or is it
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Archer, Economics of Off-Shore Oil Exploration and Production of Solid Minerals on the Continental Shelf, 1 OcEA
NAGFmT 14-15 (1973).
63. D. LxnmzicER & J. MuDGEF, SEBED MINERAL
R
EsouncEs Am tm Ecoomuc
INRr
s oF DEVELPING ColT-eEs, intro, at XXVI (1976). Pontecorvo, supra note
35, at 208. See also Archer, Progress and Prospects of Marine Mining, MWNIG MAAziu, March 1974, at 150, wherein the author points out that estimates concerning production and profitability of nodule mining require "massive assumptions" and specu-

lations on questions such as long-term metal demand and price trends, the extent of
potential reserves, the commercial feasibility of mining and the pace of technological
development of nodule mining and processing.
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the difference between actual earnings in a milieu including sea-

bed producers compared to the trend of past earnings? This would
adjust an earnings difference by the average of past earnings or account for a historical trend line in earnings. Or perhaps one should
include "losses" associated with a decision not to exploit newly discovered mineral reserves because of the threat of seabed competition. This would include the losses
associated with the foregone
4
opportunity to mine a deposit."

One handicap in attempting to assess the significance of nodule
mining on LDC producers is the failure by all of the U.N. negotiating
texts to define "adverse effects." For the purposes of this note, the
definition of "adverse effects" will be that which was formulated in
the economic analysis of nodule mining prepared by Leipziger and
Mudge; that analysis defines "adverse effects" as the actual losses in
the export earnings of land-based LDC producers whose export earnings are dependent upon the concerned minerals for not less than 5
percent of total exports and who face reductions in earnings that are
"significant in magnitude.oS This construction excludes by definition
those land-based producers for whom exports of the affected minerals
represent a small share of export earnings and those who will suffer
only slight losses in earnings as a result of nodule mining.
The second half of this note is intended to demonstrate why the
production controls of the Composite Text are unnecessarily and unjustifiably overly protective of LDC mineral producers. Using the definition of "adverse effects" as outlined above, it will be shown that, in
fact, very few LDCs will be adversely affected during the first decade
of nodule mining. In the conclusion it will be explained briefly why
the Composite Text may end up working against the interests of the
developing world by forcing the developed world to abandon the ideal
of international regulation of seabed minerals in favor of immediate
unilateral mining operations.
The bulk of the mineral data in the commodity studies that follow
was derived from U.S. Bureau -of Mines sources.
I. COMMODITY STUDIES
A. NICKEL

Nickel is a vital element in the iron, steel and aerospace industries.
It also has importance in the chemical, petroleum and electrical in64. D. LExxz~cmE
65. Id.

& J. MvncE, supra note 63, at 162.
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dustries. Its greatest value is in alloys where it imparts strength and
corrosion resistance over a wide range of temperatures."0
Both production and consumption of nickel are highly concentrated
in the developed world. In 1975, Canada, the Soviet Union and France
(through its territorial possession, New Caledonia) accounted for 65
percent of primary nickel production. With small reserves of its own
the United States imports most of its nickel from Canadian sources
either directly from Canada or by way of extraction plants in Norway
and the United Kingdom."
The leading nickel producers in the developing world supplied
slightly less than 11 percent of the world total supply in 1975; these
countries were Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Indonesia. However, the percent of nickel coming from the developing world is experiencing an upward trend; a change in the pattern of production
started in 1973 and was expected to continue through 1977 as Indonesia, the Philippines, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic produce a larger share of the total.8 A study prepared by the United

Nations concludes that it is possible that the share of world mine
production from LDC producers in 1985 will exceed 20 percent. 9
Nickel is expected to generate between one-half to two-thirds of
the revenues of the nodule mining industry and is regarded as the
backbone of seabed mining.70 The first generation of nodule mining
will be limited to four groups each producing from one to three million
metric tons of nodules annually. It is anticipated that during the first
decade of ocean mining average annual production will consist of
four to twelve million metric tons of nodules,' For this note it is
assumed that average nickel content of nodules is 1.3 percent and that
66. BuREAu oF Mmns, U.S. DEP'T. oF INEo, Nicxz - 1977, at 1, 15-17 (4
Mineral Commodity Profiles, July 1977).
67. Id. at 1, 9, 10.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Development in the International Area: Report of the Secretary-General U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/25 at 34 (Third Conference
Law of the Sea, May 1974).
70. Branco, supra note 24, at 50, 53.
71. M. Gorham, Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus and Response 19
(unpublished paper by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for presentation at
the Pacific Trade and Development Conference IX, San Francisco, August 22-25,
1977). An analysis prepared by the Department of Interior assumes as a base ease that
each ocean mining operation will recover approximately 2.72 million metric tons (3
million short tons) annually recovering nickel, copper and cobalt, with only one ocean
mining company, Deepsea Ventures, intending to use a four-metal process, recovering
manganese, at an initial annual capacity of approximately 0.9 million metric tons (I
million short tons). OcEsw MNmw AImuNLsTAnToN, supra note 33, at 7.
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the recovery rate of nickel from nodules will be 90 percent.1 2 It is
further assumed that world primary nickel demand in 1985 will be
940.9 thousand metric tons. 78 If 12 million metric tons of nodules are
for roughly 15 percent of
then produced nodule nickel would account
74
the world primary nickel market in 1985.
Because of small domestic reserves, United States land-based production of nickel satisfied only about 9 percent of domestic primary
demand in 1975. 75 Commencement of ocean mining would have dramatic effects on reducing U.S. nickel imports: production of 12 million
metric tons of nodules would yield enough nickel to satisfy more than
58 percent of the domestic primary demand in 1985.70 Assuming that
by the mid-1980s U.S. nickel imports could be reduced by as much
as 58 percent, land-based producers presently exporting to the United
States would be forced to find new outlets for as much as one-quarter
of their exports (as in the case of the Dominican Republic and Rhodesia) to more than one-third of their exports of nickel (as in the
case of Canada). 77 (Table 1).
Nickel produced from nodules is also expected to lower the world
price of nickel. An econometric model constructed by Dr. F. Gerard
Adams finds that production of seven million metric tons of nodules
will decrease the world nickel price by 11.59 percent.78 Applying this
finding on a straight-line basis to a 12 million metric ton model, the
world price level should drop by almost 20 percent.
Accordingly, a worst-possible-case scenario for the first round of
trade restructuring in the initial years of ocean mining would be for
the Dominican Republic to lose about 4 percent of its foreign export
72. STANFORD RE sEAwcH INsartrrE, supra note 30, at 126 (Table 19).
73. U.S. BUmw.u OF Mimm, supra note 66, at 15.
74. By contrast, an economic analysis prepared by the United Nations concludes that
by 1985 nodule production will be roughly 15 million metric, tons and that nodulederived nickel would account for as much as 18 percent of the world market. These
figures are somewhat high because they assume that: (1) six ocean mining groups
will be in operation by 1985 instead of four; (2) average nickel content of nodules is
1.6 percent rather than 1.3 percent (see text accompanying note 72, supra); and (3)
recovery of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese from nodules will be 95 percent
rather than 90 percent (see text accompanying note 72, supra). Report of the Secretary General, supra note 69, at 9, 27, 28, 34.
75. U.S. BuBEAu oF MINEs, supra note 66, at 11, 15.
76. Id. at 15. U.S. demand for primary nickel is expected to increase between
1975 and 2000 at an average annual rate of 3 percent. Domestic. demand in 1985 should
be approximately 240.9 thousand metric tons.
77. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 48.
78. F. Adams, Applied Econometric Modeling of Non-Ferrous Metal Markets: Ti
Case of Ocean Floor Nodules, in MiNxaAL MATEwAmlS MoDEGO 148 (W. Vogely, cd,,
1975).
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earnings and Canada about 0.5 percent.70 No figure is available for
Rhodesia. And all land-based producers would be faced with a 20
percent price cut.

TABLE 1
U.S. NICKEL IMPORTS - 1975
State
Canada
New Caledonia
Norway
Dominican Republic
Australia
South Africa
Soviet Union
Rhodesia
United Kingdom
Other
Total Imports

1000
metric tons
91
17
10
7
5
3
3
2.5
2
5.5
146

Percent
of production
exported to U.S.
37
12
0
24
7
16.5
2
23
a
8

*Norway obtains its nickel from Canada.
United Kingdom obtains its nickel from Canada and South Africa.
Source: BurEAu OF MnWs, U.S. DEPARTmFNT OF INTmoR, NicxmL - 1977
(4 Mineral Commodity Profiles, July, 1977).
Adapted from M. Gorham, Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus
and Response (unpublished paper by the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, August 1977).
79. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 48, 49. In 1974 exports of nickel constituted
14.6 percent of the total export earnings of the Dominican Republic. For Canada this
figure was 1.5 percent
It should be noted that seabed nickel will compete with nickel produced in the
Dominican Republic and New Caledonia rather than with that produced in the developed world. This is because nickel deposits in the Earth's tropical and subtropical
climates are found in lateritic ores which are significantly more expensive to mine
than sulphide ores found in Canada, the Soviet Union, Australia and South Africa.
The costs of first generation seabed mining will probably not be competitive with expansion of existing sulphide nickel mines or development of new high grade sulphide
deposits. But it is estimated that nodule nickel will be about 30 percent cheaper than
laterite nickel in terms of both capital and operating expenses and will compete with
laterites for a share of the increase in world nickel demand. Although it is unlikely
that ocean mining will displace existing laterite production, during the initial years
of operation nodule nickel may cause some new laterite nickel projects to not be developed and if energy costs continue to increase more rapidly than the general price
level some of the more marginal laterite mines may be shut down. OcEA Mwi=n An.mnsmn&AoN, supra note 33, at 4, 7, 16-18. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 33-34.
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B. COPPER

Over half of the 1.5 million metric tons of copper consumed in the
United States in 1975 was used in electrical applications such as motors,
generators, power distribution, industrial controls, communications
equipment and house wiring. Copper also has significant non-electrical
application including use in construction industries, machinery and
transportation."0
In 1976 the United States was the leading producer of copper in the
world and is largely self-sufficient. What U.S. imports there are come
principally from Canada, Chile and Peru.81
Although the world leaders in copper production are part of the
developed world (the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada
were the three largest producers in 1976) important copper producers
in the developing world include Chile, Zambia, Zaire, the Philippines,
82
Peru and Papua-New Guinea.
With an average annual growth of approximately 4 percent, world
demand for primary copper is forecast to be 10.1 million metric tons
in 1985. This amount will increase to 17.7 million :metric tons by the
year 2000. World primary reserves are expected to satisfy demand for
the rest of the century. 8
Due to the enormity of the world copper market, production from
nodules will have a very minor impact on land-based copper producers
in 1985. Assuming that the average copper content of nodules is 1.1
percent and that the recovery rate of metal is 90 percent,8 4 nodule
production of 12 million metric tons will yield only about 1.1 percent
of world primary demand in 1985.85
In 1975 primary copper demand in the United States was 1.18
million metric tons, of which 10 percent was imported.80 By 1985
domestic primary demand will be approximately 2 million metric
tons. 7 Nodule copper could account for up to 6 percent of this amount,
reducing U.S. imports by as much as 60 percent, assuming that copper
80. BunEAu ov MINEs, U.S. DEPT. oF INTEIon, CoPPER - 1977, at 1, 5-0 (3 Mineral Commodity Profiles, June 1977).
81. Id. at 1, 10.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 1, 2, 14.
84. STANFORD FSEAzCH Isrrn,
supra note 30, at 126 (Table 19).
85. U.S. BuRAU OF MINES, supra note 80, at 14.
86. Id. at 8, 14.
87. Id. at 14.

No. 1]

THE COMPOSITE TEXT AND NODULE MINING

imports remain at a relatively constant 10 percent of U.S. primary
demand.
If this 60 percent reduction is spread evenly among the six major
exporters to the United States only South West Africa (Namibia)
would have to redirect more than 10 percent of its copper exports
and would have to find new markets for one-quarter of such exports.
Peru would have to redirect 10 percent, Mexico 7 percent, Canada
and the Philippines 2.4 percent and Chile 1.5 percent (Table 2).
Adams predicts that production of 7 million metric tons of nodules
would cause a slight fall of about 1.5 percent in the world price of
copper.88 If 12 million metric tons are produced the price can be expected to fall about 2.5 percent.
Adapting from Gorham, 9 the worst possible scenario in terms of
trade adjustment is if Peru and South West Africa were cut off completely from the U.S. market. Peru would then have to find new markets for one-sixth of its copper and face a temporary loss of about 5
TABLE 2
U.S. PRIMARY COPPER IMPORTS - 1975
Percent
State
Canada
Peru
Chile

1000

metric tons
31
30
21

South West Africa (Namibia) 16
10
Mexico
9
South Africa
4.5

of production
exported to U.S.
4
17
2.5

Philippines

Australia

Other
Total Imports
Source:

42
4
12
2.5

2

1

7
130.5

1

MINEs, U.S. DiPT. OF INTErmon,
Mineral Commodity Profiles, June, 1977).
BUREAU OF

CoPPER

-

1977 (3

Adapted from M. Gorham, Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus

and Response (unpublished paper by the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, August 1977).

88. F. Adams, supra note 78, at 148.
89. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 46.
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percent in its export earnings. 0° South West Africa would have to redirect about two-fifths of its exports.9 '
However, given the fact that Peru's total copper exports account
for less than 3 percent of the world copper trade [and South West
Africa's are only about 0.5 percent] finding new outlets even under
this worst-case scenario should not prove overly difficult - espe-2
cially given the lead time available for developing new markets.0

C. COBALT
Cobalt is one of several vital alloying elements used in the aerospace and electrical product industries. Its qualities impart heat resistance, high strength, wear resistance and superior magnetic properties. 0
Cobalt is considered critical because of its uses in numerous applications including as a high-temperature resistant alloy in jet engines, in
strengthening tools in the mining and steel industries and as a desulfur4
ing catalyst in refining and processing crude oil.1

Cobalt is produced as a by-product of copper and nickel.9 5 In 1975
the leading producers of primary cobalt were Zaire with 53 percent
of world mine output, Zambia with 9 percent, Australia with 7 percent,
Morocco at 6 percent and New Caledonia also with 6 percent of world
mine output.9 6 In terms of refined cobalt production in 1975, Zaire
again lead the world with 65 percent of total production followed by
Zambia and the Soviet Union at 9 percent each, and then by France,
Norway and Finland, each of whom produced 4 percent of total refined
production. 97 Production capacities of Botswana, Cuba, Indonesia, New
Caledonia, the Philippines and Zaire are expected to increase dramatically over the next ten years as a result of expanded facilities and
the development of newly discovered resources.9 8
Cobalt has not been produced in the United States since 1971, with
90. Id. at 47 (Table 10). In 1974 copper exports made up 23.3 percent of Peru's
total exports.
91. No figures are available for South West Africa's export earnings.
92. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 48.
93. BurEAu oF MIms, U.S. DE_'T. oF Iwrmon, COnALT - 1977, at 1 (5 Mineral Commodity Profiles, July 1977).
94. Id. at 11-12.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 6. However, Moroccan resources will be depleted in approximately ten
years.
97. Id. at 3, 4, 9. Belgium does not publish production figures but it was probably
the second-largest producer of refined cobalt in 1975 with an estimated annual production of 14 million pounds.
98. Id. at 4.
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the result that U.S. industry relies almost entirely upon imports for

its supply. 9 In 1976 the United States imported 16.5 million pounds
of cobalt. Principal import sources in that year were Zaire (56 percent
of U.S. imports including that which came through Belgium), Zambia
(11 percent), Norway (7 percent), and Botswana (6 percent).100

The market for cobalt, unlike those for nickel or copper is extremely small; in 1974 the cobalt market was four one-hundredths the size
of the world market for copper. Nodule-derived cobalt could therefore seriously affect price and supply, with Zaire being most vulnerable. 110 The forecast for world primary cobalt demand in 1985 is 99.4
million pounds. 0 2 If 12 million metric tons of nodules are produced
and if it is assumed that cobalt content is 0.2 percent and that the
rate of metal recovery is 90 percent, 08 in 1985 nodule production
could yield up to 47.5 million pounds of cobalt or almost 48 percent
of world primary demand. Estimated 1985 U.S. primary demand of
25.7 million pounds' 04 could be satisfied easily by nodule cobalt.
The loss of the U.S. market to Zaire would mean a 6 percent cut
in its cobalt exports (Table 3) and an approximate 0.6 percent loss in
export earnings.' 0 5 Moreover, cobalt from nodules will probably cause
a two-thirds reduction in the world cobalt price, ultimately forcing it
down to the level of nickel where cobalt can then compete as a substitute for nickel in some applications. 00 But Zaire is the only cobalt
producer that will suffer a substantial decline in export earnings as
a result of seabed mining. No other state depends on cobalt for
even 2 percent of its export earnings, 0 7 and thus no other land-based
producer of cobalt will lose significant export revenues.
D. MANGANESE
Manganese is an essential component in the steel industry and
90-95 percent of all manganese that is consumed is used in the pro99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 9.
101. D. IPaGER & J. MiroD,
supra note 63, at 135, 138.
102. U.S. BuREAu oF Mwm, supra note 93, at 14 (Table 10).
103. STANFORD REsEARcH INSnTrOnT, supra note 30, at 126 (Table 19).
104. U.S. BuAu os Mums, supra note 93, at 14 (Table 10).
105. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 45 (Table 9). In 1974 Zaire depended on cobalt
production for approximately 9.6 percent of its total export earnings.
106. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 69, at 41.
107. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 45 (Table 9).
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TABLE 3
U.S. PRIMARY COBALT IMPORTS - 1975

State
Zaire
Belgium-Luxembourg
Finland
Norway
Canada
New Caledonia
West Germany
France
Australia
Other
Total Imports

1000
pounds
2238
1529
1105
706
415
195
87
33
10
290

Percent
of production
exported to U.S.
6
*

40

*

14
5
*
0

0.1
0

6608

•Belgium-Luxembourg obtains its cobalt from Zaire. Norway receives its
cobalt from Canada. West Germany from Finland. France receives all
of its cobalt from New Caledonia and Morocco. Other includes cobalt from
Australia and the Philippines.
Source: BuREAu OF MInS, U.S. DEPr. OF INTMUOR, COBALT - 1977 (5
Mineral Commodity Profiles, July, 1977).
Adapted from M. Gorham, Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus
and Response (unpublished paper by the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, August 1977).
duction of iron and steel.' 0 8 Because manganese consumption closely
parallels steel production, downward trends or fluctuations in the production of steel will directly affect the amounts of manganese that are
produced and consumed. 10 9 Any forecast concerning manganese production is subject therefore to developments in the world steel market.
In 1975 world production of 9.8 million metric tons of manganese
ore, alloy and metal came principally from the Soviet Union, South
Africa, Gabon, Brazil, Australia, India and the People's Republic of
China." 0 Because it lacks its own manganese ore mining industry the
108. BuREAu or Mirs, U.S. DEP'T. oF IN-mon, MANcANES, - 1977 at 1 (7 Mineral Commodity Profiles, October 1977). H. Parfet, Manganee for Steel Making: A
Crisis of the Future? 2 reprinted from InoN AN SftELAxE, Jan. 1975.
109. H. Parfet, supra note 108, at 2.
110. U.S. Bu, Au oF MINES, supra note 108, at 12. This figure includes manganeso
ores having 25 percent manganese content or greater. Since nodule manganese will be
processed into high-purity metal, immediate competition will be with imports of at
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United States is almost entirely dependent on imports and in 1975
manganese imported from Brazil and Gabon satisfied more than half
of U.S. demand.'" (Table 4).
World manganese demand in 1985 is forecast to be 13 million metric
tons. 112 This figure is based on an assumed average annual growth rate
in steel demand of 2.9 percent.'1 3 The United States is expected to
require 1.5 million metric tons of manganese in 1985, assuming that
11 4
growth in domestic steel demand averages 1.7 percent per year.

TABLE 4
a
U.S. MANGANESE IMPORTS

State
Brazil
Gabon
South Africa
France
Australia
Japan
Norway
Mexico
Zaire
India
Other
Total Imports

1000
metric tons
285
223
178
97
79
64
25
21
10
4.5
24
1010.5

-

1975
Percent
of production
exported to U.S.
36
20
7.5
b

10
b
b

17.5
6.5
0.8
24

a Total imports consist of manganese ore (25 percent or greater), alloy and
metal.
b France obtains its manganese from Gabon, Brazil and Morocco. Japan
receives -manganese from South Africa, Australia and India. Norway receives from South Africa and Brazil.
Source: U.S. BunrAu OF MmNEs, D=-r. OF InmmUOR, MANG A2EsE - 1977
(7 Mineral Commodity Profiles, October, 1977).
Adapted from M. Gorham, Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus
and Response (unpublished paper by the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, August 1977).
least this metal content. See &isoS. Whiss, MA-cAEs: TAE OraEn Uszs 108-114
(1977).
111. U.S. BurAzu oF Mms, supra note 108, at 11, 12.
112. Id. at 16 (Table 9).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Deepsea Ventures of United States Steel is the only ocean mining
concern that will recover high-purity manganese from nodules. Its
initial operation will recover approximately 1 million metric tons of
nodules annually but this amount may be increased eventually to almost 3 million metric tons per year." 5 The seabed deposit that Deepsea
Ventures intends to exploit contains nodules averaging 29 percent
manganese and will initially yield, in Deepsea's own estimate, 253,000
metric tons of manganese annually. 116 This amount will represent less
than 2 percent of the forecast world demand for 1985 and will satisfy
only about 17 percent of the estimated 1985 U.S. demand.
The only developing state for which manganese exports exceed
2 percent of export earnings is Gabon, which has derived as much as
19 percent of its earnings from such exports."" Gabon was the third
largest producer of manganese in the world in 1975118 and until re-

cently, losing the U.S. manganese market could have meant a loss of
up to 4 percent of export earnings."" However, an ever-expanding
petroleum industry in Gabon has greatly diminished the relative importance of its manganese earnings. In 1974 petroleum revenues were
more than 10.5 times greater than in 1973120 and results of preliminary
oil exploration in Gabon indicate that manganese earnings may constitute only 2 to 3 percent of overall export earnings by 1985.121
Adams found in his study that recovery of manganese from 1 million
metric tons of nodules will have no effect on the world price of manganese. 122 Therefore, losses in earnings to land-based producers will
be in terms of reduced exports only, and in the mid-1980's manganese
derived from first generation seabed mining will displace a very modest
portion of world land-based production. By the time that effects are
felt in the world manganese market as a result of nodule mining, manganese revenues will not constitute a significant share (i.e., 5 percent
23
or greater) of any LDC's export earnings.
115. OcEAN MnmaG AnmiNisTRmoN, supra note 33, at 7, A-1.
116. Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining
Rights and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment 7, 3 of
Exhibit C (1974).
117. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 44 (Table 8). In 1971. exports of manganese
were 19 percent of Gabon's total export earnings. (The most recent trade statistics for
Gabon are those of 1971).
118. U.S. Buanxu OF Munms, supra note 108, at 12.
119. M. Gorham, supra note 71, at 44 (Table 8).
120. BurxAu OF MnEs, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, 3 MINmMLS YnAjIuoor 343
(1974).
121. Tinsley, supra note 36, at 32.
122. F. Adams, supra note 78, at 148.
123. Consideration should be given to the possibility that nodule mining will sup-
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E. SUMMARY
First generation nodule mining will have some impact on mineral
markets in the mid-1980's but the effects will be limited to only a few
LDC producers. In the case of nickel, New Caledonia and the Dominican Republic each might be seriously affected with the latter experiencing a temporary loss of up to 5 percent in its foreign export earnings.
The price of nickel may also drop by as much as 20 percent as a result
of ocean mining. Chile and Peru may see a 4-5 percent decline in
copper earnings and South West Africa will probably also be adversely
affected. All producers of copper additionally will suffer a 2.5 percent
price decrease. Zaire's foreign export earnings might fall by as much
as 6 percent if nodule production causes a two-thirds reduction in the
world price of cobalt. Gabon is the only producer of manganese that
depends on its exports for a significant part of its export revenues but
the pace of oil production there should relieve Gabon of any dependency on manganese and will make subsequent losses in manganese
exports relatively insignificant.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its most fundamental sense the purpose of international management of deep seabed resources should be to balance the equitable
interests of developed and developing states. The developed world has
a legitimate desire to recoup its investments plus acceptable profits.
Because they are the major consumers of minerals, developed states
have an additional interest in tapping a supply that will provide a
reliable source of vital materials for possibly hundreds of years. Conversely, those states in the developing world justifiably seek a share
in the profits that will be realized when the "common heritage of mankind" is exploited. And if it is agreed that this is a resource belonging
plant an even smaller share of the world market than the discussion above indicates.
According to industry sources, the vast majority of manganese is used in the production of steel and for that purpose there is a preference for ferromanganese ore with
an approximate manganese content of 48 percent which is relatively cheap and available. Nodule manganese with manganese content averaging 25-30 percent is by comparison low in grade and high in contaminants. Refining processes can boost nodule
manganese to more than 90 percent purity but the cost precludes serious competition
with ferromanganese ore, the mainstay of LDC manganese producers. High purity
nodule manganese might compete successfully with massive manganese or electrolytic
manganese, both of which exceed 95 percent purity, but this is a much smaller, more
limited market than that of ferromanganese ore used in the making of steel. Private
sources believe nodule manganese will be competitive only with high purity, special
application manganese metals until present land-based deposits of high grade ore are
depleted during the next fifty to one-hundred years.
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to all, measures should be taken to ensure that its exploitation does not

bring economic ruination to mineral producers in the developing world.
Unfortunately, the Composite Text fails to cover all equities, and
in slighting those of developed states at the gain of the less developed it threatens both agreement and the common heritage principle.
First generation nodule mining does not present a serious threat
to LDC producers and does not warrant the production controls proposed in Article 150 of the Composite Text. An alternative to limiting
production might be to allow unlimited production with part of the
profits going into a protection fund to compensate those LDCs where
"adverse effects" are felt. Another possibility might be a system of

rentals whereby an ocean mining firm pays for the exclusive right to
mine a particular site with the rentals redistributed to affected LDC

producers. An international agency would be the most logical body to
124
redistribute profits and compensation funds to developing states.
In an attempt to guarantee the economic safety of LDC mineral
producers the Composite Text has dangerously thrown open the door
to immediate and unregulated unilateral action. In an address to the
convention of the American Mining Congress in San Francisco in
September 1977, Congressman John M. Murphy (D-N.Y.), Chairman
124. Other factors in favor of international supervision of the deep seabed Include
protection of the marine environment against possible destructive effects of seabed
mining. There has been concern whether sediments brought up from tho bottom might
cloud and disrupt photosynthesis in the upper areas of the ocean or whether the upraising of oxygen-poor waters from the depths might cause oxygen-starvation problems
at the surface. It appears that both of these problems may easily be solved by releasing
sediments and bottom waters through a discharge pipe well below the photosynthesis
area. Additional questions have been raised whether certain raining techniques may
destroy life on the bottom but apparently ocean mining will have much less Impact
on the deep ocean floor biomass than naturally-occurring mass transport of marina
sediments.
Interestingly, there is some speculation that nodule mining would be an overall
benefit to the environment. Clean processing of nodule metals could replace part of
the "tremendous amounts" of air pollutants associated with plant processing of landbased ores. It is also believed that because manganese nodules can absorb largo quantities of sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides they could be used in cleaning industrial
emissions and automobile exhausts. Pennington, The Restrained Race for an Ocean Resource, OcEANs, March 1976, 37 at 41-42.
A less sanguine view may be found in R.FnANx, DEEpsA MIIN AND 'M ENvmocm.rr (The American Society of International Law: Studies in Transnational
Legal Policy No. 10, 1976) wherein the author decries the lack of a comprehensive
government study assessing the probable impact of large-scale seabed mining operations
and argues that mining should be conducted initially only on a pilot project basis and
only after economic need and environmental factors are balanced. At the present time,
the greatest single problem appears to be inadequate understanding of the environments
involved (i.e., benthic, mid-depth and surface ecologies) and. insufficient data and
analysis of possible environmental effects. It is urged that an International regulatory
agency be established to control all environmental aspects of marine mining in tho
international area. Id. at 3-5, 21-31.
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of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, discussed
H.R. 3350, a bill designed to allow, in essence, U.S. mining interests
the right to begin nodule mining without the formality of an international treaty. Referring the "the Engo Secret Text," Congressman
Murphy denounced the Composite Text as a denial of due process and
a humiliation to the United States.1 25 The message seems clear: unless
negotiations begin to more fully reflect the interests of all parties, international regulation over the use of seabed resources will never be
realized and the ultimate loser will be the developing world.
The growing impatience of the United States and the developed
world was captured in a speech delivered by Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, at the
christening of the nuclear submarine New York City. He stated:
...

do the developing nations understand that by entering into

these [the Law of the Sea] negotiations, and remaining faithfully
with them, the United States and the western nations generally
have agreed to negotiate for and, in the bargaining sense, to pay
for rights which exist in the absence of a treaty? We did not have
to do this; we wanted to do it ... we wanted to establish a regime

for the use of the resources of the seabed which would produce
resources that would be shared... We did not have to do this.
We have under existing international law.., the perfect right to
extract mineral resources from the deep ocean beyond the Continental Shelf. Moreover, we have the technology to do so.126
Unless a greater willingness to compromise beyond the bounds of
the Composite Text is soon indicated, the technology referred to by
Senator Moynihan is going to be used with or without international
agreement and the opportunity for all to share in the "common heritage
of mankind" may be forever lost.
125. Address by Congressman John M. Murphy, American Mining Congress Convention, in San Francisco, (September 14, 1977).
126. Speech by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, at the launching of the U.SS.
nuclear submarine New York City, in Groton, Cona., (June 18, 1977).

